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DISENGAGED REASON AND BELIEF IN GOD 
David M. Holley 
It is sometimes assumed that the appropriate way to reflect on whether to 
believe in God is to consider philosophical arguments about whether God is 
needed as an explanation of the physical universe. I argue that treating this 
relatively disengaged form of reasoning as a primary way of deciding for or 
against religious belief confuses the issue by making belief in God into a 
kind of theoretical question. Rather than treating the idea of God as the 
answer to a question about how to explain the universe, I argue that we 
should treat it as an answer to the practical question of how to live. This 
question arises in the context of exercising agency within a value-laden 
world, and it is at this level that one can consider features of human experi-
ence that tend to drop out of our theoretical reflection, but are vital to 
acquiring or maintaining religious belief. 
Recently I listened to a high-school senior describe his thinking about 
whether to believe in God. Jefferson had been brought up in the Christian 
tradition, but he had come to the age where he was trying to work out 
things for himself. He focused his attention on the nature of the physical 
universe and whether the existence of this kind of universe called for God 
as an explanation. He toyed with the idea that the order of our universe 
might be explained by chance, rather than being the product of some kind 
of purposeful activity. Reasoning from scientific data, he was pulled first 
in one direction, then in another. In the end he was unable to decide 
between the competing hypotheses. 
As I listened to the thinking of this obviously intelligent young man, it 
seemed to me that the project he had set for himself was misdirected. He 
apparently thought that the kind of reflection he was doing would help 
him decide whether to continue to accept the religious beliefs he had been 
taught or to reject them, but his thinking about belief in God was divorced 
from any experiential confirmation he had found or failed to find as a par-
ticipant in the practices of the tradition he sought to evaluate. It was also 
disconnected from the fuller set of theological concepts that were used 
within the tradition to connect the idea of God to the believer's life. 
Jefferson treated the question of God's existence as if it were fundamental-
lya theoretical issue, arising in the context of explaining the natural order, 
rather than an issue connected with very practical concerns about how to 
live. Reasoning from a perspective in which God might be needed as an 
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explanation of the universe, but could not be considered as a potential 
object of religious engagement, he tried to settle the issue of whether to be 
a believer or not. 
The kind of reflection that Jefferson attempted could be called disen-
gaged in at least two senses. First, he was disengaged from his participa-
tion in the practices of his religious community, assuming an external 
standpoint, in order to reflect on a belief underlying those practices. This 
kind of disengagement is not in itself objectionable, though if it becomes 
too habitual, it might interfere with his ability to enter into and sustain the 
engaged mode. However, Jefferson's thinking was disengaged in a second 
way that may be more problematic. He pulled back, not just from the 
specifically religious attitudes and modes of thought needed for participa-
tion in his theistic community. He also disengaged himself from many of 
the characteristically human forms of involvement with the world that we 
set aside when we try to form objective pictures of reality. He did not 
approach his data in admiring wonder or awe or dread or a sense of mys-
tery. He was not responding to the world as an agent who must find some 
way of molding an identity and orienting his life in relation to the real. 
Rather he approached his investigation as a disinterested observer who is 
critically examining evidence. In entering the observer mode, he set aside 
features of experience that are part of our ordinary human awareness, but 
distractions when we are constructing accounts of the universe as a physi-
cal system, and the features he set aside include aspects of experience that 
are vital to becoming engaged in a religious sense. Hence, when he 
thought about the possibility of belief in God, he excluded from view con-
siderations that playa central role in acquiring or maintaining the kind of 
belief he was attempting to examine.! 
Jefferson's assumption that he needed to think about belief in God from 
a perspective that excluded certain kinds of human awareness is not idio-
syncratic. What he did in an exploratory way parallels what many 
philosophers who address the issue do with systematic precision. He put 
aside reactions that are central to ordinary living, such as moral and aes-
thetic sensibilities, in order to think about things more objectively. The 
kind of objectivity he sought is that which we idealize in scientific aspira-
tions to describe the world in terms that are independent of contingent fea-
tures of human perception and evaluation. Since the development of mod-
ern science, there has been a tendency to think that the highest level of 
human knowledge involves what Charles Taylor calls a disengaged self, 
"capable of objectifying not only the surrounding world but also emotions 
and inclinations, fears and compulsions ... "2 Such a self attempts to under-
stand reality in a way that transcends the perceptual and evaluative aware-
ness that characterizes ordinary human experience. 
Jefferson assumed that if he could think about his religious beliefs from 
an objective point of view, he would be in a superior epistemological posi-
tion to determine the truth or falsity of those beliefs. It is this assumption I 
want to challenge. While I do not question the need to consider reflectively 
the truth of beliefs that are implicit in religious engagments, I question 
whether modes of reflection that distance a person from an awareness of 
what is important or admirable or morally worthy provide a point of view 
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from which the relevant truth claims can be adequately assessed. Given 
the nature of belief in God, I will be arguing that the most relevant forms of 
reflection, especially for people like Jefferson, are those that consider the 
question from the perspective of the value-laden experience that we ordi-
narily live by. 
In section one I call attention to a gap between what belief in God means 
in a religious context and the kind of belief that Jefferson's arguments 
might enable him to acquire. Given this gap, it is unclear how deciding 
whether a being called God is needed to explain the universe is supposed 
to help in deciding whether to believe in God in the religious sense. In sec-
tion two I ask what kind of question the existence of God is and what 
modes of thought are relevant to answering this question. I claim that the 
issue should be construed fundamentally in practical rather than theoreti-
cal terms. That is, God is part of an answer to the question, "How shall I 
live?" rather than the answer to a puzzle about how to explain the world. 
Finally, in section three I apply my account to the issue of what sort of 
reflection Jefferson needs to undertake. Not surprisingly, I recommend a 
mode of thought that differs significantly from the disengaged form of rea-
soning he actually adopted. 
1. Belief in God 
Imagine, contrary to fact, that Jefferson's attempt to decide whether to 
believe in God had resulted in a conclusion supporting belief. That is, 
imagine that his efforts to objectively consider the evidence had convinced 
him that God was the best explanation of some set of facts about the natur-
al order, and hence that the existence of God was more probable than not, 
or even overwhelmingly probable. Even with this kind of "best case sce-
nario" Jefferson would still be miles away from what his religious commu-
nity means by belief in God. 
One reason is that the "God" he would have arrived at differs signifi-
cantly from the object of religious aspiration. Suppose that Jefferson had 
been able to rule out the chance hypothesis and attribute the existence of 
the universe to some kind of purposeful agency. Such a minimal charac-
terization is a long way from the rich characterizations of deity in any the-
istic tradition. He can, of course, assume that the minimally described 
being (or beings) reached in his argument is to be identified with the object 
of devotion in his tradition, but why should he? If he is doubtful enough 
of the belief derived from the tradition to think that it needs to be justified 
on independent grounds, shouldn't he be skeptical about any attempts to 
move beyond the conclusions of those independent arguments? 
Imagine that Jefferson's arguments convince him that the universe had 
an intelligent source. As Hume shows in a famous discussion, this conclu-
sion says nothing about whether such a source should be characterized as 
good or benevolent or concerned with human beings.3 Yet a deity who 
could not be described as good or who lacked interest in human life would 
hardly be adequate for the purposes of theistic religions. So if Jefferson 
discovers that our universe had an intelligent source, has he discovered 
that the God he was inquiring about exists? The conclusion he derives 
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might be compatible with the existence of God. It might even be regarded 
as a kind of independent confirmation of something that was accepted on 
other grounds, but Jefferson's project arose out of the thought that he need-
ed a means of deciding whether this religious belief is true, and even at 
best the kind of reasoning he is doing could not tell him that. 
Furthermore, even if Jefferson could decide on the existence of a being 
with the right set of characteristics, there would still be a gap between the 
kind of belief he could attain through his dispassionate mode of argument 
and what belief in God means in a religious community. In Jefferson's pro-
ject the goal is something like intellectual assent to a hypothesis that 
explains why we have the universe we do. But what a theistic community 
calls belief in God is inseparable from the attitudes needed to participate in 
practices such as worship, prayer, obedience, etc. Intellectual assent that 
did not include attitudes such as awe, reverence, gratitude, and the inclina-
tion to worship would not qualify as a genuinely religious belief. 
Furthermore, belief in God arises in a context where the believer's experi-
ence is structured by a set of paradigmatic images and stories that unite 
this belief to a way of life. When these connections are cut so that the belief 
is isolated from this larger complex, it loses its religious significance. 
Perhaps someone will argue that assent to the propositional content of 
the belief is, even if not sufficient for belief in the full sense, something like 
an initial step! But it is not as if there were a series of steps from intellectu-
al assent to engagement in the full sense. In fact it looks as if the frame of 
mind that enables one to consider the question of intellectual assent in iso-
lation from the full range of elements contributing to religious engagement 
is in tension with the frame of mind needed for maintaining belief in God. 
Being an engaged participant in theistic religious practices involves 
some cognitive understanding, but if we try to isolate the purely factual 
components of that understanding and separate them from other features 
of the engagement, we lose the frame of mind in which the responses char-
acteristic of belief in God were evoked. That frame of mind is a complex 
blend of beliefs, attitudes and acts of imagination that enable the believer 
to see the point of and become involved in the practices. One who lets go 
of that frame of mind in order to assume a more detached point of view is 
likely to find that gestalts, which depended on the more engaged stance, 
disintegra te. 
Consider an analogous case. Suppose that you have come to love some-
one, but it occurs to you that perhaps you should examine your love to 
decide whether it is worthy. So you do an objective assessment of all kinds 
of facts about your loved one. The problem is not that the facts are irrele-
vant. But the frame of mind in which we assess facts about someone is in 
tension with giving a loving response to that person. Loving involves 
some construal of the facts, but thinking of it as a purely factual question 
turns love into something else. Furthermore, it is impossible to love while 
maintaining the kind of aloofness about the object of love that one seeks in 
objective appraisals. 
The point is not that we cannot enter into objective modes of thought, 
even with regard to potential love objects. It is that the relation of love 
involves getting out of the objective mode of thought, and habitually 
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pulling back to assess things objectively interferes with the kind of partici-
patory awareness on which love depends. There may be reasonings that 
are conducive to attaining the kind of attitudes and valuations that are 
integrated in the awareness of the lover, but reasoning by itself does not 
produce love, and the detachment needed to consider some matters objec-
tively is at odds with developing and nurturing the kinds of attachments 
that need to run deep in a committed love relationship. 
Even if we imagine that Jefferson's inquiries had unambiguously sup-
ported the idea of God as an explanation of the universe, assent to such a 
being is a long way from religious belief. To be religiously significant, a 
belief about the source of the universe must be connected with the believ-
er's central concerns and motivations. But the attitude and the point of 
view Jefferson had assumed, precluded him from making these kinds of 
connections. In his inquiry the question of God's existence becomes a mat-
ter that can be considered at arm's length and discussed with a kind of 
detached indifference. But by treating the issue as a theoretical problem 
that is removed from practical concerns, he has excluded from view the 
kind of divine object that might evoke a passionate existential response. 
Nothing I have said is intended to suggest that Jefferson's mode of 
thought does not ask a legitimate question, only that the question he is ask-
ing is not the one he seems to think. Without realizing it he has changed 
the subject. Instead of talking about a reality that is of fundamental impor-
tance for who we are and how to live, the topic has been changed to dis-
cussion of a speculative idea that might be needed for theoretical complete-
ness. It is not that the hypothetical deity of a successful cosmological or 
teleological argument would be completely irrelevant to belief in God. But 
this kind of discussion shifts our attention away from the existential con-
text in which the existence of God is a pressing concern, to a theoretical 
context in which we are dealing with a different kind of issue. 
But is there an alternative? Don't we have to investigate questions of 
fact with scientific objectivity? Aren't the kinds of attitudes and passions 
that make room for more engaged responses at odds with genuine 
inquiry? I suspect that a picture of inquiry that separates it so sharply from 
all our concerns other than a concern with disinterested assessment of facts 
is not even adequate as an account of knowing in the natural sciences, and 
when we move to areas of life that most concern us, the picture distorts in 
significant ways the nature of our knowledge. We can know what is to be 
caught up in the beauty of an aria or to feel an unconditional sense of 
obligation or to identify with the plight of a handicapped person. But if we 
try to put what we know in some form that makes sense from a disen-
gaged perspective, our account is likely to lose something in the transla-
tion. Some types of knowledge depend on having the right kinds of inter-
ests, concerns, and commitments, and some failures of knowledge are fail-
ures to be engaged in the right way. 
When Jefferson tries to decide whether God exists, he assumes that he 
must take the position of an impartial observer of factual evidence who 
puts his awareness of the human significance of things on hold. He must 
stick to the facts that can be acknowledged from the viewpoint of an 
observer whose fundamental concern is to get the facts right. But to think 
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in this way, he has to frame the discussion in a manner that is suited for 
theoretical inquiry. So the question of God's existence comes to be thought 
of as a puzzle that arises in the context of trying to develop a coherent 
understanding of the natural order. The problem is that the kind of belief 
this type of thinking addresses is fairly remote from the modes of thought 
and the actual concerns displayed when people form and live by concep-
tions of the divine, and it is not clear how either success or failure in this 
project is thought to be important for a decision to acquire or maintain a 
recognizably religious belief. 
II. What Kind of Issue is the Existence of God? 
I have suggested that there is something confused about the attempt to 
decide whether to believe in God from the kind of disengaged standpoint 
that Jefferson adopts. However, I do not mean to rule out the possibility of 
reflection on this belief, only the sort of reflection that excludes factors that 
are vital to becoming engaged religiously. Jefferson treats the existence of 
God as if it were a theoretical question about how to construct an adequate 
account of the natural world. I want to suggest that we get a better under-
standing of what it means to claim that God exists by viewing the claim as 
an answer to a fundamental practical question: "How shall I live?" 
No amount of scientific understanding can tell us how to live, for this 
practical question only makes sense in a context where we attend to objects 
of human awareness that drop out in our scientific accounts. It is within the 
value-laden human world, where we find ourselves caring about certain 
things and judging what is worth caring about, that we determine by our 
conduct what concerns will be built into our identity. In that world the rele-
vant data that enters into our thinking include experiences of loving some-
one or something, aspiring to certain ideals, failing to live up to our ideals, 
becoming satisfied or frustrated at our achievements, holding grudges, 
being forgiven, being betrayed, and so on. We strive for lives that are 
meaningful and satisfying, and religions are proposed to us as answers to 
some of our deepest struggles. But the answers typically require some redi-
rection of our ends and re-formation of our identities, and in theistic reli-
gions the concept of God plays a fundamental role in revisioning and reori-
enting our lives in a direction that is offered as a path to genuine fulfillment. 
Believing in God is integrally related to living a particular mode of life, and 
without that connection it becomes something other than a religious belief. 
However, when Jefferson set out to assess his belief in God, the mode of 
life connected with that belief drops out, as does the context in which belief 
in God is offered as an answer to fundamental practical questions. Instead 
Jefferson chose as his starting point the scientific account of reality. One of 
the features of this account is adherence to a method that filters out certain 
elements of experience. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
philosophers distinguished between primary qualities, which they under-
stood as objective features of reality, and secondary qualities, which they 
dismissed from the realm of objective reality. Contemporary science has 
provided an altered version of the kind of reality that can be thought to 
exist independently of human experience, but in a scientific account it is 
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fairly clear that the human experience of value needs to be filtered out. 
Values, like secondary qualities, can be explained as bypro ducts of the 
operation of physical systems, but they cannot be treated scientifically as a 
fundamental feature of the nature of things. 
So when Jefferson sets out to discover what he needs to make sense of 
the world, it is noteworthy that the world he is trying to make sense of is 
not actually his world. He does not start from the value-laden reality that 
is the object of his own experience as a human being. Rather he starts with 
an abstract representation of that reality in which those features that seem 
most significant in the human world have been stripped away. Starting 
with such a world, he does not regard his own experience of mystery or 
wonder or attraction to an ideal as important evidential considerations. In 
a world of facts like the one he contemplates, the relevant question is 
whether there is some basic fact that is needed for explanatory complete-
ness. Human orientations that do not reduce to factual assessment will be 
irrelevant to or distractions from the theoretical issue. 
When we take the fundamental datum to be a set of objectively describ-
able facts that we can put in terms that do not presuppose our awareness of 
the sort of significance we find in the interpersonal sphere, the only form for 
the idea of God to take is that of a speculative, quasi-scientific hypothesis. 
To consider God as a potential object of religious engagement, we have to 
bring in those features of the human world that we recognize as significant 
in our experience as agents who must relate to other people, for the context 
in which God can be a potential object of the kinds of responses characteris-
tic of theistic belief is a relational context. If we exclude those elements that 
are vital to participation in the interpersonal world, we alter the meaning of 
the concept of God by removing the context in which that concept func-
tions, transforming the question of God's existence into a theoretical issue. 
Without endorsing Kant's derivation of God as a postulate of the prac-
tical reason, I want to agree with him that the question of God's existence 
is fundamentally connected to understanding the world we encounter as 
agents who must rely on features of experience that we set aside when 
we are doing scientific theorizing. To call God's existence a practical 
question is not to discount the fact that practical judgments have theoreti-
cal implications. Whatever ontology one uses to make sense of the prac-
tical world needs to be integrated with theoretical ideas. But Kant, I 
think, had it right when he affirmed the primacy of practical reason over 
the theoretical. The theoretical understandings we arrive at are subject to 
revision in order to accommodate the kinds of understandings we need 
for practical coherence. 
It is in their capacity as agents who are trying to find their way around 
in a value-laden reality that people form various religious conceptions. It 
is as they encounter the mysterious, the terrifying, the awe-inspiring, and 
the transforming phenomena of life that they speak of the gods or the 
transcendent. Certain experiences are taken as paradigmatic and revela-
tory, and the ways of thought deriving from these experiences are gener-
alized and made into interpretive tools. Critical reason goes to work on 
some of these ideas, examining them and modifying them, but the role 
these conceptions play in human life is fundamentally a practical one. 
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They guide people in making their way through a complicated and 
potentially confusing value-laden reality. 
But how do they guide? Here I want to suggest as a hypothesis the 
account that Clifford Geertz gives of the function of religion. Religion, he 
thinks, allows adherents to establish significant connections between their 
picture of reality and what they hold dear. He writes, "Sacred symbols 
thus relate an ontology and a cosmology to an aesthetics and a morality: 
their peculiar power comes from their presumed ability to identify fact 
with value at the most fundamental leveL"5 Geertz also notes that this 
function is connected with what he calls "powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations."" 
Geertz, of course, is trying to give an account which leaves questions of 
the truth of the religious adherents' ideas to the side. However, we can 
imagine someone who accepts the truth of some theistic religion agreeing 
that her religious conceptions allow her to achieve the function that Geertz 
describes. Concepts such as "God," "sin," "providence," etc. provide a 
framework in which a religious adherent integrates judgments of value 
used to orient actions and define individual identity with a view of what is 
ultimately real. Human values are seen as connected to a larger context in 
which they can be understood as deeply rooted in something beyond the 
human perspective, and in major religious traditions identification with that 
wider perspective is prescribed for achieving the highest human fulfillment. 
But on what grounds can ideas that might be practically useful be 
regarded as relevant to judging what is real? One answer is suggested by a 
famous philosophical argument from William James in which he lays out 
conditions under which it is legitimate to allow practical considerations to 
affect our theoretical judgments. James was thinking generically about a 
kind of core religious claim in "The Will to Believe" when he defended the 
legitimacy of what he called "the religious hypothesis."7 Although some 
philosophers have assumed that James was talking about belief in God, his 
account of the religious hypothesis is an attempt to characterize something 
much more general: something like a religious point of view that might or 
might not be developed in theistic directions. James describes this hypoth-
esis in terms of two affirmations: first, "the best things are the more eternal 
things" and second, "we are better off even now if we believe the first affir-
mation to be true."8 The first affirmation is a claim about value and its con-
nection to what is real. It is obviously a vague claim, but I take it to mean 
that reality at the most fundamental level is somehow in tune with our 
deepest judgments about value. Or, to put the claim in a different way, the 
kinds of significance we find vital to understanding interpersonal reality 
are clues that give us some insight into the nature of things. When James 
characterizes faith in his later piece, "The Right to Believe," he calls faith 
"the greeting of our whole nature to a kind of world conceived as well 
adapted to that nature."9 
James defends such faith on the grounds of practical necessity. There 
are some matters that cannot be decided on evidential grounds, yet 
because believing them or not believing them will make a major practical 
difference, we do not have the option of staying neutral. We will either 
live in accordance with some vision of life that affirms a fit between our 
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awareness of value and the nature of things or we will live according to a 
view that does not affirm such a fit. In James' view, if we conceive of reali-
ty as exhibiting the sort of harmony with our deepest aspirations that we 
can call good, we open ourselves to possibilities of living that would other-
wise be closed to us. Hence, he defends the right to adopt a religious 
stance toward reality, which might be correct, and which has the potential 
for improving our lives now. 
Again, I want to emphasize that James is not defending acceptance of 
any particular religion or any particular set of religious categories. Rather 
he is defending the legitimacy of adopting some view of life that fulfills the 
function Geertz attributes to religion: uniting fact and value. The religious 
hypothesis is that somehow the two fit together into a harmonious whole 
that we can recognize as good. It is easy to see how one might suspect that 
accepting such a hypothesis is just wishful thinking. But James argues that 
since we have no way of deciding such an issue on the basis of objective 
evidence and we must live by some view that expresses the religious 
hypothesis or some view that does not, we will either be influenced by our 
hopes or influenced by some other passion such as fear of being wrong. 
His own preference is to believe in accordance with his hopes, taking a risk 
of being deluded to get a chance at accepting a truth that may allow him to 
achieve a deeply fulfilling mode of life. 
Now how does all this apply to Jefferson? I would suggest that Jefferson 
is attempting to adopt a reflective stance that does not make any assump-
tions about whether there are connections between fact and value of the sort 
affirmed by James' religious hypothesis. But in practice, this results in leav-
ing the awareness of values that guides his orientation in the practical 
world out of his thinking about God's existence and sticking to the facts. 
However, when he tries to do so, theism turns into a quasi-scientific expla-
nation of puzzling facts. To avoid distorting belief in God, he needs to con-
sider this belief from a point of view that allows him to bring in the prod-
ucts of his own engagement with the value-laden world of everyday life. 
Given such a starting point, he can ask questions such as, "How can the 
kind of awareness that enables me to recognize what is valuable and worth 
doing be integrated with an understanding of the nature of things that is 
conducive to living in accordance with the values I recognize?" Theistic 
views are not the only answers to this kind of question, but one who 
approaches the issue from the perspective James endorses might find some 
theistic religion worthy of consideration as a possible answer. 
ITI. What Form Should Jefferson's Reflection Take? 
Part of the reason why Jefferson felt the need to examine the question of 
God's existence was his awareness that there are pictures of reality that do 
not include God. Consider, for example, Bertrand Russell's account of his 
atheism in "A Free Man's Worship." In this famous essay Russell 
describes a universe in which human ideals and aspirations are accidental 
bypro ducts of a scientifically describable reality that is devoid of any 
awareness of the values we affirm. In a memorable passage he writes, 
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That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end 
they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, 
his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental colloca-
tions of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and 
feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the 
labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noon-
day brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast 
death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's 
achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a uni-
verse in ruins-all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so 
nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to 
stand. lO 
What Russell presents, with his own unique flare for the dramatic, is a 
vision of reality in which scientific categories represent the way things ulti-
matelyare. In this picture there is no fundamental place for human values. 
At times Russell anthropomorphically portrays the scientific universe as 
hostile to human concerns, and he characterizes the appropriate attitude to 
take as one of "unyielding despair" in which we valiantly hold onto our 
deepest values in an environment where they are an alien intrusion, sub-
ject to being overwhelmed by the vast physical system of the universe. 
Russell's response to what James calls the religious hypothesis is clear. 
He affirms a reality that has no fundamental place for the considerations we 
find most significant in deciding how to live and, hence, no place for any 
religiously significant concept of God. If Jefferson is as captivated as Russell 
by this sort of naturalistic vision, no form of James' religious hypothesis is 
likely to be a live option. To consider belief in God and the mode of life that 
goes with it as genuine possibilities for him, he will need to explore those 
possibilities from a perspective that does not rule out a religious under-
standing of the universe. That is, to fairly evaluate a theistic vision of reali-
ty, he needs to take seriously the possibility that his awareness of value is 
not, as Russell suggests, a kind of alien intrusion, but instead a clue that 
offers some insight, even if obscure, into the nature of things. 
What form might such an investigation take? I want to describe gener-
ally two levels of reflection that Jefferson might attempt. The first is a 
reflection on his own practical world and the kind of reality in which his 
value commitments make sense. The second is a reflection on whether the 
religious categories he has been taught are adequate to or can be adjusted 
to deal with his experience. A model of the first sort of reflection is sug-
gested in Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self.l1 
Taylor argues that we cannot understand our human world if we limit 
ourselves to the kind of terminology that is appropriate for physics. In liv-
ing our lives we will find ourselves making certain "strong evaluations" 
that are not reducible to our desires or aversions, but function as standards 
in relation to which these desires and aversions can be judged. When we 
form notions that a certain mode of life is higher or worthier or more 
admirable, or when we take some goods, such as respect for life or equali-
ty, to be of incomparable importance, we are adopting an understanding of 
the good that helps us find our way around the human world. As reflec-
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tive beings, we need to try to make sense of the strong evaluations we rely 
on, but attempts to explain the basis for our judgments inevitably push us, 
argues Taylor, toward ontological frameworks. He initially describes these 
frameworks as background assumptions and later as contexts in which the 
perspective on the good we have adopted becomes intelligible. But to 
emphasize how inescapable frameworks are, Taylor also identifies them 
with the kind of orientation to the good that is needed to have an identity 
at all. Frameworks enable us to stake out our place in the practical world 
by providing something analogous to a space in which we can define what 
we take to be fundamentally important. 
So Taylor's approach suggests a process of reflection on the fundamen-
tal orientation that one assumes in having a particular identity. In trying to 
articulate the basis for the strong evaluations on which we rely to define 
who we are, we must talk about those evaluations in relation to frame-
works in which they can be made intelligible. Taylor holds that an individ-
ual can judge one framework superior to another when it makes better 
sense of her practical world. In the case of someone who finds that a theis-
tic framework helps to make intelligible the basic reactions that define her 
identity, the articulation of the connection between the framework and the 
reactions is a reason for believing in God, though it is obviously not a rea-
son for someone who is unmoved by the vision of the good that it articu-
lates. Being moved by that vision is implicitly to recognize a certain kind 
of intelligible order in which caring deeply about the values expressed in 
one's strong evaluations can be viewed as a compelling mode of life. 
Taylor emphasizes the connection between accepting a framework and 
being motivated to live a certain mode of life. Within an adequate frame-
work there will be objects that function as what Taylor calls moral sources. 
That is, they will be objects of love and admiration that empower us to live 
in accordance with our vision of the good. Plato's concept of the Good is a 
central example of a moral source, and in classical Jewish and Christian 
thought God is a moral source. Taylor argues that even in systems that 
repudiate such classical forms of metaphysics there will be elements that 
play the role of moral sources, though they may be hidden, and some 
moral sources may tum out to be deficient at a motivational level. 
So suppose Jefferson were to reflect on his most basic value reactions, 
those that define who he conceives himself to be. Perhaps they include 
such things as a passion for justice or a concern for individual dignity. 
Perhaps he has images or ideals that represent the kind of person he 
aspires to be or a manner of life he thinks of as worthy. Using Taylor's 
approach, Jefferson would ask himself why the values he takes to be fun-
damentally important are so important. What is his vision of the good, 
and in what kind of picture of reality does having such a vision and form-
ing an identity based on it make sense? Realistically, he cannot hope to 
examine all possible pictures, but he could certainly consider whether any 
assumptions needed to take his fundamental values seriously fit better in a 
theistic worldview or in a naturalistic one. 
Now the assumption that appears to underlie this procedure is that a 
framework that gives an account that is more conducive to living in accor-
dance with the strong evaluations operative in one's practical world is more 
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likely to approach the truth, or in epistemological terms that when a meta-
physical view renders the practical world more intelligible, that is a prima 
facie reason for preferring it. Such an assumption has affinities with what 
Kant calls the primacy of the practical reason. It is also related to James' 
religious hypothesis in that the hypothesis says that there is a fundamental 
fit between human aspirations and the nature of reality. All these claims 
are open to dispute, but if Jefferson is to consider the kind of evidence that 
is most closely connected with religious belief, he needs to conduct his 
inquiry using some such assumption as at least a working hypothesis. 
Taylor's approach offers a way to reflect on the existence of God that is 
engaged in a way that Jefferson's actual form of reflection was not. In 
Taylor's approach thinking about whether you can believe in God is not like 
considering a hypothesis from which you can remain aloof. Reflecting on 
the question is inseparable from thinking about who you are and what val-
ues move you. The kind of God who could provide intelligibility to practical 
concerns you find compelling is a God whose recognition is conducive to 
engagement in the way of life those practical concerns define. Approached 
in this way, reflection on God's existence becomes reflection on whether 
there is a Supreme Good that could unify various intimations of value and 
energize your aspirations through responses of love and admiration. 
Nevertheless, Jefferson's thinking on the subject is going to be deficient 
unless he also reflects at a different level. Does he find experiential confir-
mation for whatever framework helps to articulate the values that define his 
practical world? His religious tradition has offered him a whole range of 
concepts, including the concept of God, that are supposed to help him make 
sense of his world. These concepts function as interpretive categories that 
give a certain kind of order and structure to his experience. It is possible 
that the set of concepts he has inherited, including such ideas as providen-
tial care, sin, redemption, etc. are a kind of empty shell that have little rela-
tion to the way he actually understands his experiences and makes his deci-
sions. It is also possible that the paradigmatic experiences that the interpre-
tive scheme highlights, such as awareness of the holy or experiences of 
grace, have eluded him or that attempts to squeeze troubling and puzzling 
events into the religious framework have become strained. On the other 
hand, it may be that the theistic picture of reality has penetrated so deeply 
into his psyche that he cannot seriously entertain the idea of a godless 
world. To try to strip the religious framework away might be something he 
could imagine, but find uncompelling, as he tries to make sense of experi-
ences he takes as paradigmatic for understanding his life. 12 
Christian theism, the view that Jefferson set out to evaluate, offers an 
interpretive scheme in which the physical order is an expression of 
redemptive love. Some events are regarded as signs of the presence and 
activity of this deep reality, and a normative set of images and stories 
guides one's thinking about what it means to make contact with this 
redemptive love. But the appeal of this kind of framework depends on 
whether the patterns it points to seem compelling experientially. To take 
the idea of God seriously, Jefferson needs to have experiences that are illu-
minated for him when he thinks in terms of the theological categories and 
images that the tradition provides. The question of whether he believes in 
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God is a question of how dispensable or indispensable the interpretive 
scheme involving this concept is for him. That is clearly not a question he 
can ask from the point of view of a disinterested observer, and more rele-
vant than his consideration of theistic arguments that remove him from the 
realm of concrete experience will be his experiments in "trying on" the 
framework and using it to structure his world. 
Jefferson is unlikely to maintain a religiously significant belief in God 
unless he finds significant those experiences that believers have taken as 
disclosures of the ultimate. Does he have intimations of what Rudolph 
Otto calls the holy? Does he contemplate the physical universe with a 
sense of wonder and awe? Does he find in his awareness of himself or 
other people something mysterious to which he responds with attitudes 
akin to reverence? Does his awareness of certain ideals or values evoke a 
kind of absolute devotion? Has he experienced events that produce inter-
personal reactions, such as gratitude or love or guilt, that would only make 
sense in relation to a personal reality beyond the human? None of these 
questions are intended as arguments for God's existence. Rather they raise 
the issue of whether Jefferson can find the experiential threads that can be 
woven into some kind of religious engagement. The frame of mind that 
allows a person to be drawn to such an engagement is not a dispassionate 
weighing of facts, but an imaginative attentiveness to patterns of meaning 
that can evoke passionate responsesY 
If Jefferson were to discover that concepts like "God" have become 
indispensable features of his most secure grasp of the meanings of his 
experience, he might be able to look at a teleological or cosmological argu-
ment and say of the theoretical entity posited what Aquinas said: 1/ And 
this is what everyone understands to be God." But in such a case it would 
not be because his theoretical speculations had grounded his religious 
assumptions. It would rather be a matter of connecting the concepts that 
made sense of his lived reality with observations about contingency and 
apparent purposiveness that seem significant when viewed through a the-
istic lens.14 
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